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Malek and Daar [M&D] argue that parents have a duty to employ prenatal genetic 
diagnosis (PGD) if they undergo IVF knowing they are at risk of transmitting a 
serious genetic condition.  Although M&D limit their analysis to parents already 
undergoing PGD, in which they say the parental obligation is strongest because the 
benefits are significant and the parents’ burdens small, they make clear that the 
overall structure of their analysis is applicable to parental decisions generally.  
 
The legal dimension of M&D’s proposal is most analogous to suits for wrongful 
life brought on behalf of the child in which the child complains of the harm of 
(in)actions that led to its birth.(1)  Under the proposal, the harm to the child is 
being born with a seriously disadvantageous genetic condition, resulting from the 
parents’ negligent failure to undergo PGD. Our comments address the dubious 
need for this proposal, the unfair burden it places on parents with a need for PGD 
in comparison to those who do not need the procedure to conceive, the use of a 
questionable negligence standard, and the proposal’s vagueness about the types of 
conditions warranting the intervention.  We leave largely aside the most 
commonly-asserted problem with wrongful life suits: the only other option 
concerning the child who is actually born is not to have been born at all, for that 
child could not be born in the hypothesized unharmed state.(2)  
 
The ethical dimension of M&D’s proposal is rooted in autonomy and fairness.  The 
autonomy argument is that offspring without disabling genetic conditions enjoy a 
greater range of future choices, a nonstarter if the PGD-approved individual would 
be a different child. The argument also presumes choices for nondisabled children 
will be better than disabled children’s, rather than simply different. The fairness 
argument invokes equality of opportunity, deriving an obligation to inject some 
similarity of life chances into the natural lottery.  But this begs the question of 
whether the requisite equality of opportunity should be understood as similarity of 
talents or instead as similarity of opportunity to use one’s talents, whatever these 
are, successfully.  
 
Uncertain need for the legal duty. M&D characterize the legal duty in several 
different ways, each responding to a different supposed legal problem. (For a fuller 
discussion of what these problems might be, see 3). One characterization is that it 
is a breach of duty for third parties, such as reproductive practitioners, to fail to 
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such potential failures is already targeted by wrongful birth lawsuits brought by 
parents against providers for the additional costs of raising a child with a disability 
that otherwise would not have been born.  M&D contend this third-party duty can 
be extended to parents, but without explaining why the responsibilities of parents 
are analogous to those of third parties.  
  
Secondly, M&D characterize the legal duty in terms of responsibility of parents to 
care for their children. Certainly the public has an interest in ensuring that children 
are not neglected, which is protected through child protection statutes and abuse 
prevention programs.  From the parental duty of non-negligence to their children, 
M&D extrapolate their proposal, but as we argue below serious questions arise 
about whether non-neglect requires prenatal optimization of the child’s makeup 
through PGD.  
 
M&D’s third understanding of the legal duty is that parental failure to undergo 
PGD given IVF and knowledge of a risk of serious genetic disease is a private 
wrong against the resulting child, giving rise to the child’s right to sue the parent in 
tort. Presumably, in such a lawsuit the child would recover, as damages, the 
difference between the child in his/her actual state and his/her hypothesized state 
without the disorder not tested for.  Whether the parents would be considered to 
have mitigated damages by providing effective opportunities relevant to the child’s 
actual state, and how the parent might pay such compensation without 
compromising normal child-rearing activities and expenditures, are not addressed 
by M&D.   
 
Unfair burden on parents undergoing PGD. M&D make a remarkably strong 
claim:  “that once parents initiate the reproductive process, they have a duty to 
execute that process in a manner that produces the least harm to a resulting child.” 
Offsetting benefits to parents or to others such as siblings are not to be included in 
the calculation. If generalized to all reproduction, this requirement of reproductive 
harm-minimization would be violated by any parental failure to minimize risks of 
harm to the resulting child, from cocaine use to the occasional drink of alcohol to a 
job with risks of toxic exposure to the failure to reduce a multiple pregnancy.  This 
alone imposes a very strong standard on parents, one that it is difficult to 
extrapolate from its supposed legal source in non-neglect. For the harm-
minimization claim to be based in non-neglect, the parental duty not to harm must 
be construed not as the duty to refrain from subjecting children to serious risks of 
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Moreover, M&D do not clarify whether risks of harm are to be calculated absent 
offsetting benefits to the child and thus whether the approach is pure harm-
minimization, or whether the calculation is a form of harm/benefit ratio 
maximization.  If the claim is pure harm-minimization, parents may not to take 
risks for their children even when there might be benefits.  Such harm-
minimization surely does not come within the general proscription of child neglect.  
Yet if offsetting benefits are included, the duty of harm minimization has become a 
duty of harm/benefit ratio maximization. Indeed, M&D appear to understand harm-
minimization as harm/benefit ratio optimization, writing reproachfully that  “The 
law’s reluctance … to require that parents make optimal choices on behalf of their 
existing offspring is understandable in light of the deference parental autonomy 
enjoys in American life.” (p. 15) Such a conception of parental duty surely goes far 
beyond the general understanding of avoiding child neglect.  Moreover, it places a 
significant new limit on the liberty of reproducing parents undergoing IVF that is 
not placed on parents generally, arguably treating such parents in an unfairly 
differential manner.   
 
Negligence. In arguing that that parents who fail to engage in reproductive harm-
minimization are negligent, M&D rely on the law of child neglect, analogizing the 
parent forsaking PGD to the parent not acquiring needed medical care on behalf of 
his/her child. Setting aside whether this analogy begs the question of the need for 
the PGD, and construing the parental duty to seek medical care in terms of harm 
minimization, negligence is equated with non-harm-minimization.  The failure to 
meet the minimum standard of care for parenting is the failure to minimize harms.  
In other areas of negligence law, however, the failure to meet a minimum standard 
of care is not ratcheted up to the requirement of harm-minimization.  Physicians 
are not required to minimize harm to their patients, for example.  Even impositions 
of strict liability require only marketing of products that are not unreasonably 
dangerous, in contrast to the marketing of products that harm-minimize. Even more 
debatable, the M&D proposal equates harm-minimization with ensuring genetic 
normality.  
 
Vagueness about conditions warranting PGD. The paradigm condition cited by 
M&D is ARPKD, described as having a 13-50% probability of death during 
infancy and an 82% probability of 10-year survival after infancy, often with need 
for treatment of hypertension, kidney or liver transplant.  Manifestations of the 
disease vary depending on the mutation.  M&D do not state if PGD can predict 
phenotypic disease severity, or whether it matters on their view whether it can.  
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a high survival probability but requiring treatment of hypertension during 
childhood.  
 
Finally, there seems to be no actual problem this tort theory is needed to address: is 
there need to incentivize parents undergoing IVF to choose PGD?  We are unaware 
of evidence that parents in these circumstances forego PGD in significant numbers, 
or that parents who do not choose PGD fail to provide adequately for children thus 
born, or that children born with serious genetic diseases when these births were 
avoidable by PGD need to obtain compensation from their parents regardless of the 
lives these children actually lead.  Without such evidence, it seems problematic to 
risk introducing a new cause for litigation based on biological characteristics that 
might for this reason stigmatize individuals at risk of transmitting the 
characteristics claimed to be damaging. And, as well, to stigmatize children who 
express these characteristics by casting them as potential adversaries of their own 
parents and thus as potential despoilers of their families. 
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